I. Introduction
Empirical studies of the economics of crime have established credible evidence regarding the impact of sanctions on criminal activity. In particular, it has been demonstrated that increased arrests and police have deterrent effects on crime (Corman and Mocan 2000 , Levitt 1997 , Grogger 1991 . The analysis of the determinants of homicide is especially important because it poses an interesting test for economic theory.
According to the standard economic model of crime, a rational offender would respond to perceived costs and benefits of committing crime. Murder is an important case to test this behavioral hypothesis because murder may be considered a crime which can be committed without regard to costs or benefits of the action. However, empirical tests reveal that even murder responds to costs of crime. For example, Mocan (2000, 2002) show that an increase in murder arrests decreases murders in New York City. Capital punishment is particularly significant in this context, because it represents a very high cost for committing murder (loss of life). Thus, the presence of capital punishment in a state, or the frequency with which it is used should unequivocally deter
homicide. Yet, it has been a difficult empirical task to identify the impact of capital punishment on homicide simply because there is not much variation in the execution 2 rates in a cross-section of states, or over time to estimate its impact on homicide with precision.
The statement of former U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno cited above highlights the mixed scientific evidence on the deterrent effect of the death penalty. Ehrlich (1975) and Ehrlich (1977a) found a significant deterrent effect of capital punishment on murder rates using aggregate time series, and cross-sectional data, respectively. Ehrlich's findings were challenged by subsequent work (Leamer 1983; Hoenack and Weiler 1980; Passell and Taylor 1977; Bowers and Pierce 1975) based on the identification of the murder supply equation, functional form of the equations estimated, the sample period investigated and the choice of variables. Ehrlich and others responded to these criticisms (Ehrlich and Liu 1999; Ehrlich and Brower 1987; Ehrlich 1977b) . Nevertheless, the issue of whether the death penalty deters murder is still debated in the media, 1 as well as in academia (Dezhbakhsh, Rubin and Shepherd 2002, Sorensen et al. 1999; Cameron 1994 ; Cover and Thistle 1988; McManus 1985; McFarland 1983; Layson 1983; Forst 1983 ).
Because of the ethical, moral and religious aspects of capital punishment, executing death row inmates generates repercussions, even from outside the United States. For example, Pope John Paul II appealed to then-Governor George W. Bush to stop an execution scheduled for January, 2000. Recently, state lawmakers have been 3 reacting to the sentiment that there is arbitrariness and possibly a racial bias in the implementation of the death penalty by proposing legislation to either abolish it, or instate a moratorium. 2 Similarly, a bill was introduced in United States Congress recently to abolish the death penalty under Federal law. 3 In this paper we investigate whether the death penalty is a deterrent for homicide.
An inherent difficulty in uncovering an impact of deterrence on crime is to find appropriate data sets to overcome the issue of simultaneity between criminal activity and deterrence measures. Low-frequency time series data or cross-sectional data are not satisfactory to address the issue Mocan 2000, Levitt 1997 ). We use a statelevel panel data set that contains information on homicide and other crimes, deterrence variables, relevant capital punishment measures along with a number of state characteristics.
An innovation of this paper is the use of a Department of Justice data set, which is new to the literature. This data set contains detailed information on the entire 6,143 deaths sentences between 1977 and 1997 in the United States. For example, the reason and exact month of removal from death row is identified for each prisoner. This information is valuable as it allows us to link executions to criminal activity in the proper time frame. More specifically, previous studies linked the crime rate in a given year to the number of executions in the same year. However, if an execution takes place towards the end of a year, it cannot considerably effect crime rates in that same year (as the number of crimes for that year have been committed since January).
Rather, such an execution is expected to impact the crime rate of the following year.
This issue is potentially significant because 47 percent of all executions, 53 percent of all removals from death row for reasons other than executions and other deaths, and 51 percent of all commutations (reductions in sentence) between 1977 and 1997 took place between the months of July and December.
Another innovation of this paper is to investigate the impact on homicide of removals from death row. A removal from death row takes place if capital sentence is declared unconstitutional by state or U.S. supreme court, or conviction is affirmed but sentence is overturned by appellate court, or conviction and sentence are overturned by appellate court, or if the prisoner is commuted.
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In this paper we investigate the impact of removals, and also the impact of commutations (a subset of removals) on homicide. Both of these represent a decrease in the expected cost of committing the crime, and should have a positive impact on the homicide rate. The impact of commutations and removals from death row on homicide or other crimes have not been investigated before.
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We find statistically significant relationships between homicide and executions, commutations and removals. Specifically, each additional execution (commutation) reduces (increases) homicides by about 5, while an additional removal from death row generates about one additional murder.
Section II gives the background on death penalty in the United States. Sections III and IV describe the methodology and the data, respectively. Section V presents the results. Section VI consists of the extensions, and Section VII is the conclusion. 
II. Recent History of Capital Punishment and the Data Set

III. Empirical methodology
To investigate the impact of capital punishment and other forms of deterrence on homicide, we estimate regressions of the following form:
where MURDER it is the homicide rate in state i and year t, and DETER stands for the vector of deterrence variables. Following Ehrlich (1975) and the literature that follows, DETER consists of the subjective probabilities that potential offenders are apprehended, convicted and executed. The first one of these probabilities is measured by the murder arrest rate (the proportion of murders cleared by an arrest). The second probability is calculated as the ratio of death sentences in year t divided by murder arrests in year t-2.
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Following Levitt (1998) , and Katz, Levitt and Shustorovich (2001) , incapacitation is calculated as the number of prisoners per violent crime.
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Following the results of Katz, Levitt and Shustovich (2001) we also included the prison death rate, a measure of prison conditions, as another deterrence measure. 6 Dezhbakhsh, Rubin and Shepherd (2002) use the same measure. In our inmate-level data set, the annual average duration between a murder arrest and the day the inmate is sentenced is about 1.3 years. Using sentences in year t to arrests in year t-1gave identical results. To be comparable to Dezhbakhsh, Rubin and Shepherd (2002) , we reports results with arrests lagged two periods. 7 As Levitt (1998) notes, the number of individuals in custody as a fraction of the population may correspond more closely to the theoretical notion of incapacitation. Thus, as an alternative measure we also employ the number of prisoners per population.
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The fifth variable in DETER pertains to the probability of execution given conviction.
Following Dezhbakhsh, Rubin and Shepherd (2002) we calculate the risk of execution as the number of executions in year t to death sentences in year t-6.
The data set also contains information on death row inmates who are commuted. An increase in this type of clemency implies a decrease in the probability of execution, which economic theory predicts should have a positive impact on murder rates. We use the number of commutations divided by death sentences six years ago as an (inverse) deterrence measure. As an alternative measure of inverse deterrence we use a more comprehensive measure of removals from death row. This pertains to all removals other than executions and other deaths on death row. These include inmates who received a commuted sentence and those who are removed from death row because the capital sentence is declared unconstitutional by the state or U.S. supreme court, conviction is affirmed but sentence is overturned by an appellate court, or conviction and sentence are overturned by an appellate court.
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8 In an earlier version, we calculated this probability as the number of executions per death row inmates in the same year. Although this is a measure of a flow over a stock, we obtained very similar results.
9 Dezhbakhsh, Rubin and Shepherd (2002) perform their analysis at the county level. Another difference between their paper and ours is that we employ a larger number of deterrence variables. 10 Following Katz, Levitt and Shustorovich (2001) , Mocan and Corman (2000) , and Levitt (1998) , deterrence variables are lagged once to minimize the impact of simultaneity between the murder rate and deterrence measures. Because the number of homicides appear in the numerator of the independent variable and in the denominator of the homicide arrest rate and prisoners per violent crime, measurement error in homicides generates biased estimates. Unlike other types of crimes, measurement error in the homicide variable is unlikely to be 9
The vector X contains state characteristics that may be correlated with criminal activity. It includes information on the unemployment rate, real per capita income, the proportion of the state population in the following age groups: 20-34, 35-44, 45-54 and 55 and over, the proportion of the state population in urban areas, the proportion which is black, the infant mortality rate, and the legal drinking age in the state. Theoretical and empirical justification for the inclusion of these variables can be found in Levitt (1998) , and Lott and Mustard (1997) . The variable µ i represents unobserved statespecific characteristics that impact the murder rate and η t represents year effects. To control for the impact of the 1995 Oklahoma City bombing, we included a dummy variable, which takes the value of one in Oklahoma in 1995 and zero elsewhere. The models also include state-specific time-trends represented by 4 it .
IV. Data
We use data from Capital Punishment in the United States, 1973 States, -1998 consequential. Nevertheless, lagging the deterrence measures also helps minimize this potential bias as well (Levitt 1998). This data set allows us to analyze, for the first time in this literature, the impact of commutations and total removals from death row on the homicide rate. An increase in the number of commutations handed to death row inmates implies a decrease in the risk of execution. Thus, an increase in the commutation rate is expected to be positively related to murders. The same is true for total removals from death row. The same algorithms are applied for commutations and removals. As a second measure, we created the following algorithm: If an execution took place within the first three quarters of a year, we attributed that execution to the same year. If the execution took place in the last quarter of a year (October-December) we attributed that execution to the following year under the assumption that the relative impact on murders would be felt in the following year. The same was done for removals and commutations. the empirical results. The sources of these data are described in the Appendix. Table 1 also displays the standard deviations of the variables after removing state fixed-effects, time effects and state-specific time trends. The variation goes down significantly for some variables such as Urbanization, Percent Black and the age distribution variables, but substantial variation remains for most others.
V. Results Table 2 presents a number of different specifications. Column I contains the specification where the homicide rate is explained by the probability of arrest (the number of murder arrests divided by the number of murders), the sentencing rate (the number of death sentences divided by the number of murder arrests made two years prior), the custody rate (the number of prisoners per violent crime), the risk of execution (the number of executions divided by the number of death sentences six years prior), and a number of state characteristics.
The model in column I as well as all other specifications estimated in the paper include state fixed-effects to control for state-specific characteristics that are not captured by the control variables, as well as time dummies and state-specific trends. Columns II and III of Table 2 report the results of the models with commutation and removal rates, respectively. Column IV includes execution and commutation rates jointly, and column V displays the results of the model which contains execution and removal rates jointly. The execution, commutation and removal rates are all prorated measures. Using the alternative second measure did not alter the results. Similarly, measuring the custody rate as prisoners per population produced very similar results.
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In all specifications, the coefficient of the execution rate is negative and statistically significant, indicating that an increase in the risk of execution lowers the 14 homicide rate. Because the annual average time between a sentencing and removal from death is about five years, the removal rate is deflated by the number death sentences five years prior. As depicted in Table 2 , the commutation rate and the removal rate from death row have positive and statistically significant impacts on the homicide rate. The custody rate (prisoners per violent crime) has a negative impact on the homicide rate. The same is true for the homicide arrest rate, although the coefficient is not statistically significant in all specifications. The prison death rate and the sentencing rates are not significantly different from zero.
To investigate the sensitivity of the estimated standard errors to an alternative way of controlling for the potential serial correlation in errors, we estimated the models by incorporating an AR(1) structure in the errors within each state. The results remained the same. We also deflated the number of death sentences by once-lagged murder arrest rate to arrive at the sentencing rate, which did not alter the results.
The magnitude of the impact of an execution is surprisingly similar to that reported by Ehrlich (1975) . Using the average of the coefficients estimated, each additional execution (commutation) results in a reduction (increase) of murders by about 5. The impact of total removals is smaller: Each removal from death row other than execution and death yields about one additional homicide.
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Columns VI and VII 12 These results are available upon request.
13 The impact of a 1-unit increase in executions, commutations and removals is calculated as (Pop)/Sent/1000, where is the estimated coefficient of the deterrence variable (execution rate, commutation rate or the removal rate), Pop is the mean of the population used in the estimation 15 of Table 2 display the results of the models employing the logarithms of the murder rate. They are consistent with the ones where the homicide rate is in levels.
In Table 3 To investigate whether the presence of the death penalty has a direct impact on the homicide rate, we added a dichotomous variable to the models which takes the value of one if capital punishment is legal in the state and zero otherwise. The existence of the death penalty in a state is unlikely to be an exogenous event; rather it may be influenced by the murder rate. To avoid this simultaneity, we lagged value of the dummy variable. The result is presented in column I of Table 4 . There is sufficient sample, Sent is the mean of the number of death sentences, which is the denominator of the deterrence variables. We divide by 1000 because the homicide rate is scaled by 1000. and it is straightforward to show that Equation (4) can be re-written as
Equation (5) suggests that the presence of capital punishment, although endogenous, can be instrumented with twice-lagged deterrence variables and two lags of capital punishment law. The results of the instrumental variables estimation are presented in columns IV and V of Table 4 with commutation and removal rates, respectively. Again, the coefficient of the death penalty indicator (Death Penalty Legal) is negative and statistically significant. The coefficients in Table 4 suggest that an additional execution generates a reduction in homicide by a magnitude of 5, an additional commutation increases homicides by 4 to 5, and an additional removal brings about one additional murder. The coefficients of other deterrence variables are also consistent with those reported in previous tables. Estimating these models with the 18 second measures of execution, commutation and removal rates or using the prisoners per population as the measure of incapacitation did not change the conclusions.
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VI. Extensions
We estimated the models with the addition of quadratic state-specific time trends.
This specification puts heavy demands on the data. Nevertheless, we obtained very similar results although the precision of the estimated coefficient of the execution rate was lower in models with the commutation variable, and the precision of the removal rate was lower in models with that measure. (2001) we used prisoners per population as the measure of custody, or when we used the removal rates.
Katz, Levitt and Shustorovich
VII. Conclusion and Discussion
The investigation of whether the death penalty deters homicide is important from an academic as well a public policy point of view. Although these results demonstrate the existence of the deterrent effect of capital punishment, it should be noted that there remains a number of significant issues surrounding the imposition of the death penalty. For example, although the Supreme Court of the United States remains unconvinced that there exists racial discrimination in the imposition of the death penalty, recent research points to the possibility of such discrimination (Baldus et al. 1998 , Pokorak 1998 , Kleck 1981 . Along the same lines, there is evidence indicating that there is discrimination regarding who gets executed and who gets commuted once the death penalty is received (Argys and Mocan 2002) .
Given these concerns, a stand for or against capital punishment should be taken with caution.
Figure 1
The Homicide Rate vs Total Executions in the United States 6.5 7 7.5 8 8.5 9 9.5 10 10. 5 11 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 Homicide Rate (x100,000) The number of homicides divided by the population, multiplied by 1000. The number of observations for the execution rate and commutation rate variables is 750 because of the six-year lag of the denominator. Similarly, there are 800 observations for the removal rate variables because of the fiveyear lag of the denominator. 
